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the deaths of all U.S. 15- to 24-year-olds that were classified as homicides according to the International
Classification of Diseases (codes E960-969) from 1970 to 1998. The legalization of abortion is associated over
a decade later with a gradual reduction in the homicides of White and non-White young men. The effect on
the homicides of young women is minimal. We conclude that the 1990s decline in the homicide of young men
is statistically associated with the legalization of abortion. Findings are not consistent with several alternative
explanations, such as changes in the crack cocaine drug market. It is almost inconceivable that in the United
States of today, policies affecting the choice to have children would be justified as a means to control crime.
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In this paper, we examine the association between the legalization of abortion with the 
1973 Roe v. Wade decision and youth homicide in the 1980s and 1990s.  An interrupted time 
series design was used examine the deaths of all U.S. 15-24 year olds that were classified as 
homicides according to the International Classification of Diseases (codes E960-969) from 
1970-1998.  The legalization of abortion is associated over a decade later with a gradual 
reduction in the homicides of white and non-white young men.  The effect on the homicides 
of young women is minimal.   We conclude that the 1990s decline in the homicide of young 
men is statistically associated with the legalization of abortion.  Findings are not consistent 
with several alternative explanations, such as changes in drug markets such as in “crack” 
cocaine.  It is almost inconceivable that in the United States of today policies affecting the 
choice to have children would be justified as a means to control crime.  Yet, if the legalization 
of abortion had this unintended effect, the full range of policy implications needs to be 
discussed.   
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Youth Homicide and the Legalization of Abortion 
Whatever the moral and political content of Roe v. Wade, there is the important 
empirical question of the decision’s impact on violent crime.  In a recent paper by Donohue 
and Levitt (2001), findings are presented which would seem to support the view that the 
legalization of abortion is associated with declines in crime nearly two decades later.  Two 
explanations are proposed:  the size of the population at risk is reduced; and, “unwanted” 
children, who would likely receive inferior care, are not born.  The former shrinks the number 
of potential perpetrators and victims overall, while the latter reduces in particular the number 
of children more likely be associated with in serious criminal conduct (Loeber & Stouthamer-
Loeber, 1986; Laub, 1993; Widom & Maxfield, 2001). 
 The response from the academic community was swift and critical.  Joyce (2001), 
using different statistical models, failed to find any meaningful statistical relationships 
between the legalization of abortion and subsequent crime.  Lott and Whitley (2001), using 
still other statistical models and somewhat different data, asserted that if anything the 
relationship is positive--the legalization of abortion is linked to subsequent increases in crime.  
 As we explain shortly, it is impossible to determine from the three extant studies 
where the truth of the matter may lie.  In this paper, therefore, we step back from the dueling 
regression models and try first to answer a simpler question:  what is the evidence for or 
against any empirical relationship between the legalization of abortion and subsequent crime?  
We use data and a research design that we hope avoids many of the complications faced by 
the three earlier studies.  Then we turn to the matter of explanation, and here, too, we use data 
and a research design that we hope will, in a more accessible manner, clarify the issues.  
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We cannot here review in detail the very extensive and complicated analyses 
previously conducted.  There are a host of arcane details that would obscure more than they 
would enlighten.  Fortunately, it is easy to describe enough about the data and research 
designs used to suggest that another approach could be instructive.   
All three studies noted above lean most heavily on a clever design that capitalizes on 
some states legalizing abortion  before other states.  States are the unit of analysis.  Roe v. 
Wade gave women nationwide the right to choose, but some states had legalized abortion a 
few years before the 1973 decision.  Thus, the late legalizers can serve as a comparison group 
for the early legalizers.  If there are abortion effects on subsequent crime, they should be 
found for the early legalizers and not the late legalizers during a window that depends on the 
legalization dates.  For example, suppose that State A legalized abortion beginning in 1970 
and State B legalized abortion in 1973.  If there are subsequent reductions in crime as a result 
of legalized abortion, State A should begin seeing them 3 years earlier (e.g., 1985 compared 
to 1988), so that during that 3-year window State B is a control observation for State A.  The 
five States that repealed their antiabortion laws before 1973--New York, Washington, Alaska, 
Hawaii, and California--constitute the experimental group with all other states in the control 
group.  
  In each study, a range of crime measures served as the response that was hypothesized 
to decline in the late 1980’s or early 1990’s.  Data on the suspects in these crimes were used 
in most of the analyses.  It is widely appreciated that law enforcement data can be a problem 
in studies such as this for two key reasons:  first, not all crimes are reported to police and, 
second, not all crimes are solved.  For example, although homicide is the crime for which the 
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best law enforcement data exist, an arrest was made in fewer than one-half of the homicides 
committed in Los Angeles in 1990-1994, a situation that was not uncommon in large U.S. 
cities at the time.  From 1980 to 1996, clearance rates dropped by 7% nationally (Wellford & 
Cronin,  
The analyses that each article deemed most complete introduced, through regression-
based causal modeling, a variety of statistical controls for the many potential confounded 
effects at the state level.  Depending on the authors and the models, these can be almost 
anything that might affect aggregate crime:  a variety of demographic variables, economic 
conditions, crime control measures, and social services programs, or various proxies thereof.  
In some cases, the regression models employ a very large number of parameters, representing 
numerous double and triple interaction effects.  
 As one would expect, the statistical analyses of such complexity were burdened by all 
of the usual regression analysis problems:  missing data, measurement error, untestable 
assumptions, overfitting, multicollinearity, and the like. The statistical procedures used are 
certainly routine enough and the underlying mathematics well understood.  The complexity 
results from the large number of parameters estimated and translating the estimates into 
meaningful substantive statements.  Often the problems are extremely damaging.  For 
example, there are no credible measures of the number of abortions before legalization, and 
the numbers officially reported afterwards are believed to be rough approximations of the 
truth (Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1997). Thus, the intervention (i.e., number of abortions) is 
not accurately measured.  Misleading estimates of any associations with the intervention can 
follow.  When, instead, legalization is treated as an intervention step function through a binary 
variable (i.e., 0 before and 1 after), one necessarily neglects that legalization is not the same 
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as implementation.  It could take several years for clinics to gear-up, for example.  Again, this 
can yield misleading estimates of potential intervention effects. 
 To the authors’ credit, many such problems were openly discussed and for some of the 
difficulties, a serious effort was made to explore their implications.  Unfortunately, none of 
the difficulties addressed could be solved definitively, and none of the manuscripts provided 
readily accessible results from the range of regression diagnostics one would ideally like to 
see (Cook, 1998).  In our view, however, an even more fundamental concern lies with using 
states as the unit of analysis.  In particular, one has to assume that abortions in a given state 
affect crime in that same state many years later.  One obvious problem is that pregnant 
women may well travel across state lines to seek an abortion, especially in the early 1970s 
when abortion was legal in some states but not others.  Equally obvious is that during nearly 
two decades between the time a pregnancy is either terminated by an abortion or produces a 
live birth and when impacts on crime could materialize, the mother and/or the child could 
move to another state.  (Joyce [2001] attempted to address these issues by using state of birth 
for homicide victims and state of residence for women who obtained abortions. The latter data 
are incomplete because, among other reasons, some states [e.g., California] do not require 
abortion reporting.)  States also differ widely in immigration from abroad, which can affect 
the number of potential crime victims and potential crime perpetrators whatever the abortion 
practices of the state in question.  Destination states such as California, Texas, and New York 
are good examples of states where international in-migration would substantially increase the 
number of both potential victims and perpetrators.  
 In summary, we suspect that the past studies have asked too much of the data and of 
the causal modeling approach, with the risk that compelling results in any direction are 
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unlikely.  This is, more generally, a widely recognized problem.  Box (1976: 792) 
provocatively noted a generation ago that “all models are wrong,” while Mosteller and Tukey 
(1977: 387) concluded at about the same time that “the whole area of guided regression is 
fraught with intellectual, statistical, computational, and subject-matter difficulties.”  Such 
concerns have certainly not gone away.  Commenting on regression models, Breiman 
(2001:203) recently observed that “Nowadays, I think most statisticians would agree that this 
is a suspect way to arrive at conclusions.”  Thus, we consider below an alternative strategy 
with somewhat less ambitious aspirations that does not demand more than the data could 
possibly deliver.  
Methods 
Design and Statistical Analysis 
We take a quasi-experimental perspective and employ an interrupted time series 
design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963).  The interrupted time series design provides an 
alternative framework to observational studies analyzed with regression-based causal 
modeling.  The unit of analysis is the country as a whole.  Aggregating over states eliminates 
state boundaries, which surely makes sense for efforts to characterize the impact of the federal 
decision.   
We use yearly data on the number of homicides beginning in 1970 and ending in 
1998, allowing for a roughly equal number of years before and after the time when a change 
in homicide could be expected.  The years before the intervention’s possible effect serve as 
the control group, and the years after serve as the experimental group. 
 The number of homicides each year is the response variable.  We chose homicide 
because it is the most accurately reported crime and the crime that state penal codes treat as 
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most the serious (i.e., can lead to the longest sentences and/or the death penalty).  We used 
national mortality data from:  1) National Center for Health Statistics, Public use data file 
documentation:  Multiple cause of death for ICD-8 1970-78 data, Public Health Service. 
Hyattsville, Maryland; and 2) National Center for Health Statistics, Public use data file 
documentation: Multiple cause of death for ICD-9 1979-98 data, Public Health Service. 
Hyattsville, Maryland.  We included all deaths that were classified as homicides according to 
the International Classification of Diseases (codes E960-969) (ICD, 1969, 1979).  As we 
describe shortly, it is also possible to obtain homicide breakdowns by age, gender, and 
race/ethnicity that will prove to be important when we elaborate on the basic research design. 
 Because we are considering the national as a whole, the intervention is defined as the 
1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade.  Anticipating the use of a transfer 
function to capture possible associations (Box, Jenkins, and Reinsel, 1994), the intervention is 
represented by a 1-0 binary variable formulated in three ways:  1) as a spike (an abrupt change 
in a differenced series), 2) as a step (a change in slope in a differenced series), or 3) as a ramp 
(a change in slope in an undifferenced series).  These variations permit the modeled response 
to take on a wide variety of shapes.  We also explore empirically several lagged effects, 
beginning in 1973, in an effort to determine when any associations might begin to appear.  It 
is important to stress that we are looking for a discrete change in the response, that is, in 
homicide trends.  Consistent with the interrupted time series design, “pre-existing” changes in 
levels and trends are removed by differencing, for example, differencing would remove any 
relatively smooth trends in population sizes.  In other words, the original time series is taken 
to be non-stationary but homogeneous.  In practice, the homogeneity assumption does not 
prove to be especially restrictive, but differencing cannot remove, for example, explosive (i.e., 
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exponential) growth or decay.  The goal is not to explicitly represent a large number of 
potential confounded variables but to remove their collective effects.  
 But even at its best, the interrupted times series design will only indicate that the 
response variable is altered in some specified manner at about the same time as the 
intervention occurs.  It cannot eliminate the possibility that the change in the response is 
linked to one or more other discrete events that occurred at approximately the same time.  
Moreover, whatever patterns observed in the data are extrapolated beyond the end of the time 
series at great risk. 
 To address these concerns, we employ four strategies.  First, we undertake separate 
analyses for male and female victims and for white and non-white victims:  white males, non-
white males, white females, and non-white females.  The goal is to evaluate possible 
confounders against an explanation resting heavily on abortion legalization.  For such 
analyses to be credible, we assume, consistent with past research, that people tend to kill 
others like themselves.1  Two broad expectations follow. 
 An apparent drop in non-white male homicides associated with earlier abortion 
legalization might be alternatively explained by a stabilization in the crack cocaine markets in 
the early 1990s (e.g., Blumstein et al., 2000).  However, that explanation does not seem 
credible for a similar decline in white male homicides because crack was not widely used by 
whites, and whites generally were not seeking to control crack markets in inner cities.  
Abortion legalization, in contrast, could well impact both white and non-white males.  Thus, 
                                                 
1 This follows from the kinds of activities engaged in (e.g., gangs) and more generally, social 
and economic forces that tend to foster interaction among people who are alike.  The ways in 
which income often produces class and racial homogeneity within neighborhoods is one key 
instance. 
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if we find an association between the legalization of abortion and subsequent crime for white 
and non-white males, an explanation based primarily on patterns of crack use is unsatisfying. 
 In addition, females are far more likely than males to be killed by people they know 
and especially by men with whom they have a romantic relationship (Greenfield et al., 1998).  
Most “domestic” homicides involve female victims beyond their teenage years and still older 
male perpetrators.  One might anticipate no strong associations between the legalization of 
abortion and subsequent female homicides.  For any alternative explanations to be credible, 
they would have to similarly predict substantial associations for male homicides but not for 
female homicides.  
 The second strategy is to conduct separate analyses by the age of the homicide victim 
as well as by ethnicity and gender.  We use 15 year olds as the youngest age group because 
that is a reasonable initial age in which one might observe involvement in very serious crime.  
It follows then, that the earliest time at which one could find any subsequent changes in 
homicides would be 1988 (i.e., 1973 + 15 years).  The next year, 1989, one might anticipate 
as the first in which one might see changes in homicides for 16 year olds.  Generalizing from 
this concept, one can expect such change to occur in later years (i.e., at longer lags) with 
increases in age.  However, age differences of a few years or less do not provide social 
boundaries as clear as ethnicity or gender.  It would not be statistically aberrant, for instance, 
to find a 16-year old male killed by a 19-year-old male.  Therefore, empirical support for this 
pattern could be difficult to find.  
 Our third strategy rests on the expected size of any intervention effects for different 
age cohorts.  Recall that legalized abortion could, in principle, affect both the number of 
potential homicide victims and the number of homicide perpetrators.  But for individuals over 
 10
Legalized Abortion and Youth Homicide     11  
 
 
about 25 years of age, there is not enough time by the end of the homicide time series for 
legalized abortion to affect them directly.  Insufficient time has passed since 1973.  Therefore, 
any reductions in their homicides could only result from a decrease in the number of younger 
perpetrators; the number of potential victims older than 25 is not being altered.  Thus, one 
might anticipate that any declines in homicide associated with the intervention would be 
smaller for the cohorts 25 and over compared to cohorts less than 25 years of age.  Moreover, 
any declines should be less substantial with increased age over 25 because of greater distance 
in age from potential perpetrators.  
 Our final strategy also rests on the size of any homicide declines for different age 
groups.  One can think of the ages of potential homicide victims as providing a moving 
window for prospective homicide perpetrators.  For example, a 15 year old may be most 
likely to be killed by an 18 year old, and 18 year old may be most likely to be killed by a 20 
year old, and so on.  Other things equal, this implies that the largest reduction in homicide 
victims (associated with the intervention) should be among age cohorts between about 18 and 
22 years old.  For the youngest ages, only older perpetrators could be affected by the 
legalization of abortion and for the oldest ages only younger perpetrators could be affected. 
Results 
 We begin with the results for 15-24 year old homicide victims.  Table 1 shows several 
summary statistics for each of the 40 time series, one for each race-gender-age combination.  
The average number of homicide victims per year is largest for non-white males, followed by 
white males, followed by both sets of females, which are rather similar.  Such large 
differences between males and females raise the prospect that the underlying causes and 
dynamics of homicide could be rather dissimilar.  Within each race-gender subset, the average 
 11
Legalized Abortion and Youth Homicide     12  
 
 
number of homicide victims generally increases with age until around 20, at which time the 
averages tend to level off.  Somewhat in contrast, the standard deviations stabilize in the late 
teens and for nonwhite males actually decline in their 20's.  
    ____________________ 
    Insert Table 1 about here 
    ____________________ 
 Figures 1a-1d show, for each race-gender subset, the number of homicide victims by 
year for persons who are 15, 19, and 24 years old.  (The other ages are not plotted in order to 
make the trends more apparent, but the longitudinal story is much the same if they are 
included.)  The series for white and non-white males (e.g., Figures 1a and 1b) all show a 
transition from a positive to a negative slope in the early to middle 1990s.  It is difficult to see 
a similar pattern for white females (e.g., Figure 1c) although there are hints.  For nonwhite 
females, we see a bit stronger suggestion of the positive to negative transition in the early to 
middle 1990s (see Figure 1d).   
    ________________________ 
    Insert Figures1a-1d about here 
    ________________________ 
 
The intervention analysis followed conventional procedures. Each of the 40 time 
series were first analyzed using ARIMA models.  Each time series for the males produced 
white noise after a first difference.  No autoregressive or moving average parameters were 
required.  The time series for the females was white noise without any differencing or 
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autoregressive or moving average parameters.  In each case, white noise time series were 
confirmed with conventional tests.  
The timing of the intervention was taken to be 1988, 15 years after Roe v. Wade (Lott 
and Whitley, 2001).  For the males, cross-correlations between the intervention and the 
differenced response failed to reveal any structure when the intervention was defined as a 
spike or a ramp for lags up to 10 years after 1988.  With the intervention defined as a step 
function, cross-correlations between each of the white noise time series and the intervention 
showed promising negative correlations at lags of between approximately 2 and 8 years.  We 
also estimated impulse response functions for each time series, which arrived at the same 
conclusions.  Based on the cross-correlations and estimated impulse response function, 
changes in the slope of the original (undifferenced) time series seemed to be the most the 
plausible.  The rate of increase in the number of homicide victims declined.   
For the females, similar analyses were undertaken.  Changes in the number of 
homicide victims associated with abortion legalization were small and could be equally well 
characterized by a change in level or a change in slope.  In other words, the “signal” was too 
weak to convincingly summarize. 
Finally, based on these results, transfer function models were specified that included a 
constant and a binary variable for the intervention.  The particular binary form chosen was 
designed to capture any changes in slope for both the males and females.  We decided to 
apply a change in slope formulation for the females so that it would be consistent with the 
model for males.  The overall conclusions we discuss later are effectively the same if a change 
in level approach is used instead. 
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We also experimented with lagged values of the response and with autoregressive 
and/or moving average terms for the disturbances.  For both males and females, the fit of the 
models was improved a bit by adding an autoregressive term at lag 1 to the residual structure.  
While the estimated effect parameters did not change enough to affect any overall 
conclusions, the estimated standard errors usefully improved.2 
To shore up the cross-correlation and impulse response function results, we 
experimented with transfer function lags of from 1 to 7 time periods.  Depending on the 
particular time series, the anticipated negative effects began to appear after a lag of between 1 
and 3 years.  But for most, the largest negative effects were found at lags of 5 years or longer.  
In the interest of parsimony, we show below only the earliest negative effects with p-values 
less than .05 (one-tailed tests).  If there is no p-value that small, we show the effect with the 
smallest p-value.  While these decisions are somewhat arbitrary, they also are not very 
important.  For the vast majority of the analyses, all of the effects after a lag of 2 or 3 years 
were negative.3 
Sex-ethnicity-age findings 
Table 2 shows the model results.  For white males, the reductions in slope range from 
a little more than 14 homicide victims a year to nearly 28 homicide victims a year.  P-values 
vary between .016 and .19, with associated lags of between 3 and 7 years (after 1988).  
Beginning at age 19, the reductions are all in the middle to high 20's.  These figures reflect a 
change in slope, which necessarily translates into a far larger change in level by the end of the 
                                                 
2 Each time series is a count for which the Poisson distribution would seem appropriate.  
However, the mean of each series is sufficiently large so that the normal distribution should 
be closely approximated.  Q-Q plots of the residuals were consistent with this. 
3 Given all of the model building tests and the many time series analyzed, conventional p-
values cannot be taken very seriously to begin with.   
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time series.  For example, if the effect estimate is –20 homicide victims, the slope of the 
number of homicide victims per year is 20 homicide victims smaller each year.  
Consequently, over a 5-year period, there would be 100 fewer homicide victims.  This is a 
large relative reduction given that the average number of homicide victims per year for white 
males is in the middle 200s.  One can plainly see just such a reduction in Figure 1a after about 
1994, especially for the older white males.  A drop from, say, 250 to 150 homicides would 
lead to a rejection the null hypothesis of no effect with a p-value far smaller than .001.  In 
short, the balance of evidence suggests there is a decline in growth of homicide victimization 
is roughly consistent with abortion legalization.  
    ____________________ 
    Insert Table 2 about here 
    ____________________ 
 
For nonwhite males, the reductions in slope range from about 12 to over 50, with lags 
from 4 to 7 years.  P-values vary from .01 to .08 with all but one less than .05.  Just as with 
the white males, the reductions accumulate so that over a 5-year period, for instance, an 
overall decline of well over 200 homicide victims can be predicted by the model.  This 
corresponds well with Figure 1b, and such reductions lead to a definitive rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no change.  Clearly, the association with abortion legalization is strong.  
 For white females, the reductions in level range from a little over 1 homicide a year to 
a little over 4 homicides a year.  P-values range from .03 to .37.  While these small reductions 
accumulate over time, even the accumulated reductions are unimpressive.  Indeed, one cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of no change even for these cumulative reductions.  Therefore, 
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while the consistent negative pattern (over time and for different age cohorts) fits with the 
findings for white males, the associations are at best weak.   
For nonwhite females, the reduction in slope ranges from effectively 0 to over 4.  Lags 
vary between 0 and 7 years with p-values between .004 and .47.  Once again, even the 
accumulated reductions are small, and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  Thus, while 
most of the estimated effects are once again negative, the associations with abortion 
legalization are unimpressive. 
 To briefly summarize, over all of the time series, negative effects predominate that are 
roughly consistent with the timing of abortion legalization.  But the effects are strong only for 
the males and, coupled the weight of the statistical evidence, heavily against the null 
hypothesis.   
Causation 
What can now be said about legalized abortion as a causal explanation?  Perhaps the 
best way to answer that question is to try to rule out alternative explanations.  A good starting 
point is to keep in mind that any alternative explanation for the homicide declines must 
correspond in time and form to hypothesized impacts of abortion legalization.  Thus, changes 
in police or incarceration practices that might account for the results would have to be 
implemented abruptly in the late 1980s or early 1990s across the country as a whole (or at 
least in a number of large states).  A similar argument holds for changes in social processes 
that might explain the homicide reductions.   
Consider the explanation based on a waning of the crack epidemic and the violence 
associated with it.  Our findings reflect large homicide reductions for both white and non-
white males.  Yet, crack cocaine use and distribution was dominated by non-white males and, 
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therefore, cannot easily explain the drop in homicides for white males.  Insofar as one 
concludes that the homicide declines for white and non-white females are real, there may be 
further evidence against the reduction in crack popularity as an across-the-board explanation.  
It might still be an important factor in the declines for non-white males.    
 Recall that we also hypothesized that the associations between the legalization of 
abortion and homicide reductions would be found at longer lags for older victims.  For white 
and non-white males, this is true.  The correlation between the lag at which the effect is first 
found and the age of the victims is .58 for white males and .57 for non-white males.  No such 
effects are found for females.  This implies that at least for males, alternative explanations for 
the apparent role of abortion legalization would have to account for a delayed impact 
positively associated with age.  This would seem to rule out a wide variety of law 
enforcement explanations for the drop in male homicides, and yet is consistent with our 
notions about how legalized abortion might function.  The same argument would seem to 
further undercut the impact of crack cocaine as an across-the-board explanation. 
 Finally, we hypothesized that if abortion legalization were an important explanation, 
any declines in homicide associated with abortion legalization would be greater for age 
cohorts under 25 than age cohorts 25 and older.  In addition, more generally, the estimated 
declines in homicide victims would be greatest in the late teens through the early to middle 
20s.   To test these notions, we obtained time series data for homicide victims between 26 and 
34 years of age, estimated the same kinds of transfer function models used for the younger 
cohorts, and then, in Figures 2a-2d address these predictions.  All are scatter plots with the 
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estimated effect size on the vertical axis and age on the horizontal axis.4  The overlay is a 
lowess smooth (Cleveland, 1979). 
 For white males (Figure 2a), we clearly see that the effects are indeed larger for those 
under 25 and generally higher in the late teens and early to middle 20s.  Much the same story 
can be found for non-white males (Figure 2b).  For white and non-white females (Figures 2c 
and 2d), neither hypothesis is supported.  Thus for males, one would be again be hard pressed 
to find a law enforcement explanation that would fit the patterns in the data and the crack 
cocaine explanation would be likewise challenged. 
    _________________________ 
    Insert Figures 2a-2d about here 
    _________________________ 
 
Discussion 
For males, there appear to be strong associations between the number of homicides 
and lagged effects of abortion legalization.  For females, the associations are at best small.  
But is there a causal story in all this?  Our statistical model is not causal; unlike previous 
work, there are no causal mechanisms explicitly built into the data analysis.  Potential causal 
explanations, therefore, must be evaluated through the effect patterns by race, gender and age.   
 For a causal explanation about homicide trends to be credible, it has to account for the 
following:  1) a relatively abrupt reduction in slope for male homicides in the early 1990s; 2) 
at best, weak associations with legalized abortion and homicide for the females; 3) for the 
                                                 
4   The effects selected from each analysis are, just as before, those with the shortest lag with a 
p-vale less than .05, or if there were no p-vales smaller than .05, the effect for the lag with the 
smallest p-value. 
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males, a strong tendency for longer lagged effects to be found for older age cohorts; and 4) 
larger effects for males in their late teens and early 20s.  The legalization of abortion would 
seem to fit all four requirements.  We can think of no other explanations that do.  
 Title X is one possibility, but other data do not support it as an alternative explanation.  
In 1970, Title X of the Public Health Service Act was signed into law, creating for the first 
time a comprehensive federal program that provides family planning services to low income 
women.  The number of publicly funded Title X clinics grew rapidly and in 1972, Congress 
amended statute (Title XIX of the Social Security Act) to mandate inclusion of family 
planning services into all state Medicaid programs to address the disparities of services across 
states (Gold, 2001).  The primary type of service provided by Title X clinics is contraceptive 
counseling and contraceptive method dissemination.  Title X clinics are explicitly forbidden 
to use program funds for abortion services.  Evaluation studies show that the Title X program 
has substantially reduced the number of unintended pregnancies (Darroch & Samara, 1996), 
by one estimate, over 20 million unintended pregnancies were averted in the last two decades 
(Gold, 2001).  Title X has been described as the single most successful U.S. family planning 
(i.e., non-abortion) policy (Meier & McFarlane, 1995).  Some research suggests that the 
prevention of pregnancy and the abortion decision are independent processes (e.g., 
Friedlander, Kaul, & Stimel, 1984).  Moreover, as pointed out in the introduction, 
Donohue and Levitt (2001), by comparing states that were early- and late-legalizers of 
abortion, essentially rule out Title X as an explanation for their study findings.  Given that we 
confirm their empirical results, it appears that the observed effect is largely related to Roe v. 
Wade, not Title X. 
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We stress, however, that some other explanations may account for part of the findings.  
Thus, it is still plausible that the decline in crack use can explain at least part of the reduction 
in homicides for non-white males.  It may, indeed, help explain why the reductions for non-
white males were so large--the legalization of abortion and the declines in crack both played a 
role.   
 We cannot think of explanations for the pattern of findings that would compete with 
the legalization of abortion.  However, that does not mean there are none and we certainly do 
not definitively demonstrate that legalization caused the reductions in male homicides.  There 
may never be a definitive answer. 
Policy implications 
 Policy has both intended consequences and unintended consequences.  The legalization 
of abortion was anticipated to have several intended consequences, among them to increase 
women’s control over their reproductive choices, decrease births of children who were 
“unwanted,” and eliminate negative health effects of illegal abortions.  There have been 
unintended, or perhaps at least unanticipated, consequences as well.  Providers of legal 
abortion services have been the target of picketing, terrorist threats, and homicide, as have the 
women who use their services.  More recently, researchers have examined the possibility that 
the legalization of abortion has been responsible for changing the size and nature of an age 
cohort, which, in turn, reduced violent crime in the U.S. 
 Legalized abortion is different from many, albeit not all, other policies in that a behavior 
has been interpreted as an individual right accorded by the U.S. Constitution.  Looking at the 
effects of women’s reproductive choices shifts the focus from women’s reproductive freedom 
to the effects on a cohort and, by extension, society.  It is almost inconceivable that in the 
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United States of today policies affecting the choice to have children would be justified as a 
means to control crime.  Yet, if the legalization of abortion had this unintended effect, the full 
range of policy implications needs to be discussed.  In particular, there may well be 
interventions of a less controversial nature that could have some of the same beneficial 
consequences.  If, for instance, an intermediate goal is to reduce the number of children who 
are born into environments that put them and, ultimately, others at risk, reducing unwanted 
pregnancy may merit attention as a potential intervention.  Policies and reproductive 
technologies (e.g., long-term hormonal contraception) that will allow women to make 
decisions regarding their child bearing should increase wantedness of their children.  One 
likely outcome will be parents who raise children when they consider themselves ready and 
able, which has the greatest potential for positive life outcomes for the next generation. 
Conclusions 
 Determining a causal relationship between legalized abortion and homicide is a 
difficult task.  Many other variables, far too numerous and complex to be sufficiently taken 
into consideration, influence the occurrence of homicide.  Using a straightforward 
methodological design to look for the potential effect of legalizing abortion in the U.S. upon 
youth homicide, we find that the data are consistent with such a possibility for young men.  
The findings do not appear to be consistent with alternative explanations, but we cannot rule 
out that such alternatives exist.  However, if the results are correct, various means of reducing 
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Figure 1a. Homicide victims: white males age 15, 19, 24
year

















Figure 1b. Homicide victims: non-white males age 15, 19, 24
year
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Figure 1c. Homicide victims: white females age 15, 19, 24
year











































Figure 1d. Homicide victims: non-white females age 15, 19, 24
year











Figure 2a. Estimated effect: white males
age














































Figure 2b. Estimated effect: non-white males
age














































Figure 2c. Estimated effect: white females
age
















































Figure 2d. Estimated effect: non-white females
age



































Table 1.  Characteristics of 40 homicide time series: 1970-1998
Sex-race-age group Obs Min Max Mean Med SD
Male
White 15 29 35 120 65.5 59 25.9
16 29 53 177 107.3 99 36.3
17 29 78 235 152.6 140 44.6
18 29 112 289 205.1 200 52.9
19 29 126 324 232.2 223 51.4
20 29 128 333 243.9 242 50.9
21 29 148 366 254.4 257 50.8
22 29 159 373 260.0 262 50.9
23 29 156 355 261.4 266 54.7
24 29 142 359 250.4 260 48.0
Non-white 15 29 37 182 86.3 69 42.4
16 29 61 298 143.3 119 69.8
17 29 121 431 219.7 160 100.8
18 29 151 547 280.8 203 131.9
19 29 175 569 317.6 241 131.3
20 29 192 595 328.6 283 119.3
21 29 214 572 348.4 319 100.1
22 29 218 515 345.7 329 80.0
23 29 254 519 339.9 330 71.2
24 29 220 444 335.5 329 57.1
Female
White 15 29 16 44 29.5 29 7.1
16 29 25 58 40.1 41 7.9
17 29 21 65 46.1 48 11.2
18 29 35 99 61.6 60 12.7
19 29 43 95 67.8 68 13.5
20 29 43 113 71.2 72 19.4
21 29 39 102 69.8 74 17.2
22 29 43 104 74.4 73 15.8
23 29 33 90 70.1 71 15.7
24 29 33 100 70.3 74 15.6
Non-white 15 29 12 42 22.2 21 7.1
16 29 19 47 28.8 27 7.4
17 29 21 53 35.9 36 9.1
18 29 32 63 46.5 46 7.2
19 29 33 80 54.4 54 11.6
20 29 46 82 60.0 58 10.2
21 29 40 88 62.4 62 12.0
22 29 38 86 65.0 67 13.0
23 29 30 91 65.8 67 13.3
24 29 37 85 67.8 70 12.3
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Table 2.  Effect size for earliest lag that is statistically significant
Lag for the model Constant Effect coef. P
Male
White 15 5 4.09 -14.89 * 0.020
16 4 6.60 -19.06 * 0.016
17 3 9.43 -22.25 0.065
18 4 8.17 -16.82 0.188
19 7 7.23 -24.771 0.111
20 7 6.64 -25.418 0.064
21 5 8.34 -27.34 0.074
22 5 7.05 -25.223 0.075
23 6 5.86 -23.48 0.111
24 7 5.09 -27.715 0.126
Nonwhite 15 4 3.70 -12.13 * 0.039
16 4 6.65 -29.28 * 0.027
17 4 13.11 -42.15 * 0.021
18 4 18.09 -53.24 * 0.010
19 4 15.17 -41.08 * 0.028
20 4 15.87 -51.49 * 0.020
21 5 14.11 -43.70 * 0.021
22 4 10.21 -34.35 * 0.039
23 4 8.72 -28.47 * 0.023
24 7 8.46 -40.71 0.076
Female
White 15 7 29.74 -1.08 0.369
16 7 40.53 -2.66 0.146
17 5 47.31 -2.05 0.209
18 0 63.32 -1.13 0.327
19 0 71.04 -1.52 0.054
20 0 76.64 -2.86 0.158
21 0 75.37 -2.60 * 0.025
22 0 79.39 -2.33 0.155
23 0 75.05 -3.37 * 0.028
24 4 74.03 -4.39 0.091
Non-white 15 7 22.92 -2.65 0.215
16 6 28.86 -1.33 0.221
17 7 35.67 0.24 0.471
18 1 45.16 0.68 0.108
19 4 55.76 -1.42 0.159
20 6 61.32 -2.63 0.078
21 4 65.36 -3.06 * 0.024
22 6 67.23 -4.47 0.050
23 2 70.13 -3.05 * 0.004
24 0 71.35 -1.87 * 0.020
* p < 0.05 (one-tailed test)
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